‘Empirio-criticism’ by Noe Keiichi（野家啓一）1998

Empirio-criticism is a form of positivist epistemology based on pure experience. It was founded by Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach, and carried on by Joseph Petzoldt and Heinrich Gomperz. Its influence remained mostly within the German-speaking world, but similar ideas can also be found in Karl Pearson in England. It rejected dualistic assumptions such as those between physical and psychological phenomena, subject and object, consciousness and existence, as well as metaphysical additions such as substance and causality. The goal of cognition was considered to be the description, according to the principle of the economy of thought, of a purely empirical concept of the world derived from this elimination. The theses of “overcoming mind–body dualism” and “return to immediate givenness” formed part of the basic intellectual currents at the end of the 19th century, in common with William James’s radical empiricism, Henri Bergson’s philosophy of life, and Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy of pure experience. Its scientific-theoretical aspect influenced later logical positivism through Mach and Pearson. Lenin, moreover, wrote Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909), in which he severely criticized the idealist tendencies of empirio-criticism from the standpoint of Marxism.
Noe Keichi, “Empirio-criticism,” Heibonsha World Encyclopedia, 1998

It's been quite some time since I first saw the above description, yet it strangely stuck with me and won't leave my mind. It should relate to the arguments of philosopher of science and intellectual historian Stephen Toulmin, which I've already covered on my blog, as well as Akira Mizunami's “The Parable of Pointing at the Moon” and Yoshinori Shiozawa's discussion of complex systems. But I still can't quite grasp its true nature. For now, I'll jot it down as a memo for future reference.

※See　ポアンカレ『科学と仮説』岩波文庫(1985年) Jules-Henri Poincaré, La Science et l’hypothèse(1902): 本に溺れたい

※See  野家啓一「経験批判論」1998: 本に溺れたい