The Thing-in-Itself as a Linguistic Act of Negation

— On the Exteriority of Language and the Generation of Being —

I. Problem Setting

Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, introduced the concept of the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) as a negative notion (Grenzbegriff) that designates the unattainable limit of human reason. Likewise, Sigmund Freud’s the unconscious (das Unbewusste) points to an unknown domain that lies outside consciousness yet governs human behavior and speech. Both terms refer to “what cannot be known” or “what cannot be spoken of.”

Yet the very act of naming “what cannot be spoken of” is already a form of speech, an act of saying. If this is true, then at the very moment Kant and Freud declared that we “cannot” grasp or speak of something, that negative expression already achieved a positivization within the domain of language. Language, even through negation, constructs the world.

This paper explores this paradox to reconsider the proposition that “humans cannot step outside language” not as a statement of limitation, but as a principle of ontological generation.

II. The Linguistic Act of Negation — The Structure of “Not”

Negation in language is not the simple indication of absence or nothingness; it is a syntactic and semiotic operation.
When one utters, “This is not a table,” one cannot negate without first invoking the concept of “table.” Negation always carries the shadow of affirmation. The statement “This is not a table” introduces into the world a new position of being—“something other than a table.”

Thus, negative linguistic acts (such as “the unconscious,” “the thing-in-itself,” or “ineffable”) both indicate the outside of language and simultaneously generate that exterior within language itself. Language possesses the capacity to make even the unutterable exist “as if” (als ob). In this sense, negation should be redefined not as a mere boundary but as a performative act that creates existence.

III. Kant’s “Thing-in-Itself” and the Performativity of Language

For Kant, the thing-in-itself refers to the “presupposed limit” that lies behind phenomena yet can never be experienced. However, the very act of naming it constitutes a linguistic moment in which reason constructs its own exterior. Kant sought to delimit reason, yet by naming its “limit,” language objectified the limit itself.

Language thus not only refers to the exterior of reason but creates it. The thing-in-itself can therefore be reinterpreted not as an epistemological boundary, but as the linguistic trace by which reason generates its own horizon. Language, even when operating in a negative mode, possesses the constructive power to shape the plane of being.

Note 1. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B307ff. The Ding an sich is that which cannot be known, but which reason is compelled to think as lying beyond phenomena.
Note 2. Jacques Derrida, De la grammatologie (1967). Derrida shows that “language precedes presence,” and that even negative concepts are instantiated within linguistic structures.

IV. Freud’s “Unconscious” and the Structuring Power of Language

What Freud “discovered” as the unconscious is, in fact, a linguistic hypothesis designating the exterior of consciousness. Once the word unconscious was introduced, human beings could no longer speak of themselves without it. Here Lacan’s insight resonates—“the unconscious is structured like a language.”

The unconscious is not a physiological entity but a symbolic space that allows us to “speak of what cannot be spoken.” Thus, even this negative term functions as something that exists within the network of language. Negation, in this case, structures being itself.

Note 3. Sigmund Freud, Das Unbewusste (1915). Freud describes the unconscious as a psychological formation derived from the mechanisms of repression, yet the concept itself depends upon linguistic operations.
Note 4. Jacques Lacan, Écrits (1966), especially “The Return of the Repressed,” where Lacan famously states that “the unconscious is the discourse of the Other.”

V. The Linguistic Shell as an Ecological Interface

Language is not a mere representational tool; it is a boundary apparatus (interface) between humans and the world.
When a person rides a “bicycle,” they are not only physically interacting with an object but experiencing it through the linguistic concept “bicycle.” Language functions as a mapping device that projects objects into a horizon of meaning; only through this operation can humans engage with the world.

Therefore, humans cannot step outside the shell of language. Yet this very shell enables contact with the environment and functions as a malleable interface that generates new modes of being. The limits of language are simultaneously the conditions of disclosure.

Note 5. Jakob von Uexküll, Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere (1909). Every organism inhabits its own Umwelt; in humans, this environment is structured through language.
Note 6. Ernst Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (1923–29). Humanity is defined as “the symbolic animal,” accessing the world only through symbolic forms.

VI. Conclusion

Both Kant’s thing-in-itself and Freud’s unconscious were introduced as that which is “unreachable” or “unspeakable.” Yet the moment these negative terms were named, language rendered them existent and integrated them into the network of thought. The act of negation itself generates being—a paradox that reveals the inseparable relation between humanity and language.

Hence, the statement “humans cannot step outside language” should not be understood as a pessimistic one. Rather, it signifies that humans continuously generate the world through language. Language is not a boundary, but the horizon of creation.

Note 7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), Proposition 5.6: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”