未発の潜勢力としての「Chaos 混沌」Ⅱ／ “Chaos” as a latent force Ⅱ

　Cosmos（秩序）は、それがかつて流動(flux)する Chaos に起源を持っていたとしても、やがてその溌溂とした運動は影を潜める。なぜなら、コスモス化するとは、世界内の不確実性／偶有性の縮減を意味し、自己保存と反復を通じた、確実性／必然性／計算合理性の強化に他ならないからである。また運動自体はむしろ既成の Cosmos にとり世界の動揺を意味してしまうからである。だから Cosmos は修正と延長を繰り返しながら、 solid 化しその壮麗な外観とは裏腹にゆっくりと朽ちていく。

　では、清新な Cosmos は何処から訪れるか。これを人間的・歴史的世界に翻訳して言えば、その萌芽は、solid化が亢進する中心部とは反対にむしろ脆弱性／朽壊化する（価値的）外縁部にあって、既存秩序から遊離せざるを得ない幾つもの小さな chaos の渦、つまり非文脈化した、 agents と resources の新たな選択的親和関係（elective affinities/Wahlverwandtshaften）の生成（Emergence）として現れる。この幾つもの小さな chaos の渦が、一定の flux まで育ち、新たな Cosmos に生長するかどうかは、事前には当事者たちにもわからない。それが誰の眼にも明らかになるのは後世の観察者がそれに名を与え、記述し言説化した後だからである。

Cosmos (order), even if it once originated from the flux of Chaos, eventually sees its vigorous movement fade into the background. This is because “cosmos-ization” signifies a reduction of uncertainty and contingency within the world; it is nothing other than the reinforcement of certainty, necessity, and calculative rationality through self-preservation and repetition. Furthermore, movement itself tends to disrupt the established Cosmos. Thus, while the Cosmos undergoes repeated revisions and extensions, it solidifies and, contrary to its magnificent appearance, slowly decays.

　So, where does this fresh Cosmos come from? To translate this into human and historical terms, its seeds lie not in the core—where solidification is intensifying—but rather in the fragile, decaying (in terms of value) periphery—opposite to the core where solidification intensifies—as the emergence of numerous small vortices of chaos that are compelled to break away from the existing order; that is, as the emergence of new elective affinities (Wahlverwandtschaften) between agents and resources that have been decontextualized. Whether these numerous small whirlpools of chaos will grow to a certain flux and develop into a new Cosmos is something even the participants themselves cannot know in advance. It only becomes clear to everyone’s eyes after observers of later generations have named it, described it, and turned it into discourse.

※参照／ See.
未発の潜勢力としての「Chaos 混沌」／ “Chaos” as a latent force: 本に溺れたい

Charles Sanders Peirce’s assessment of Hegel (2)

Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to steer its course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. Hegel first made the world understand this; and he seeks to make logic not merely the subjective guide and monitor of thought, which was all it had been ambitioning before, but to be the vert mainspring of thinking, and not merely of individual thinking but of discussion, of the history of the development of thought, of all history, of all development.
Charles S. Peirce, 'Evolutionary Love' (1891), Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays, edited and introduced by Morris R. Cohen, with an essay by John Dewey, introduction to the Bison Books Edition by Kenneth Laine Ketner, 1998, Univ. of Nebraska Press, p.294 (Reprint of 1923 ed. by Harcourt, Brace and World)

The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient. Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might have looked up to him as the treat vindicator of their truth. (Of course, the external trappings of his doctrine are only here and there of much significance.) For pragmaticism belongs essentially to the triadic class of philosophical doctrines, and is much more essentially so than Hegelianism is. (Indeed, in one passage, at least, Hegel alludes to the triadic from his exposition as to a mere fashion of dress.) 
Charles S. Peirce, 'What Pragmatism Is' (1902), Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance), edited, with an introduction and Notes by Phlip P. Weiner, 1966, Dover, p.202

　Just reading the above doesn’t make much sense. According to Shunpei Ueyama’s commentary in the Japanese edition of the anthology, the situation is as follows: When considering both the logical unfolding and the temporal development of a system, formal logic can describe only the logical unfolding. In formal logic, temporal development cannot, in principle, be described. And it seems that Hegel’s dialectic is valued as the descriptive logic for this latter aspect—the temporal development of a system.

※Please also refer to the following.
Two approaches to the Emergence

Two approaches to emergence

　Emergence refers to the behavior of a system that cannot be logically derived from the sum of the regular and simple behaviors of the elements that make up that system.

　When considering emergence, I believe there are two prominent approaches: “evolutionary theory” and “dialectics.”

１）The Theory of Evolution
　W. James interpreted the theoretical essence of evolutionary theory as follows.
　He stated that, in Darwinism, the two processes of “mutation” and “natural selection” are regarded as independent, unrelated phenomena. In other words, W. James understood Darwinism to be a theory that links two distinct types of change occurring in nature while keeping them separate.

２）Dialectics
　Peirce, the father of pragmatism and its greatest theorist, stated, “Even if it is dressed in strange garb, my philosophy is a revival of Hegelian philosophy.” It appears that Peirce valued dialectics as a methodological approach for describing the behavior of a system evolving over time. Furthermore, the pragmatist John Dewey was a Hegelian in his youth.

　Whether we are talking about “evolutionary theory” or “dialectics,” it is reasonable to expect that they share a deep theoretical affinity with pragmatism. Or rather, it seems possible to use pragmatism as a bridge to connect “evolutionary theory” and “dialectics” theoretically. Furthermore, my current prediction is that this could represent a significant breakthrough for contemporary systems theory.

[See] Our article below
The essence of Darwinism(Japanese Version)
Charles Sanders Peirce’s assessment of Hegel

From Max Weber to Jacques Barzun

Niemand weiß noch, wer künftig in jenem Gehäuse wohnen wird und ob am Ende dieser ungeheuren Entwicklung ganz neue Propheten oder eine mächtige Wiedergeburt alter Gedanken und Ideale stehen werden, oder aber - wenn keins von beiden - mechanisierte Versteinerung, mit einer Art von krampfhaftem Sich - wichtig - nehmen verbrämt. Dann allerdings könnte für die »letzten Menschen« dieser Kulturentwicklung das Wort zur Wahrheit werden: »Fachmenschen ohne Geist, Genußmenschen ohne Herz: dies Nichts bildet sich ein, eine nie vorher erreichte Stufe des Menschentums erstiegen zu haben.«
Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1920

Even if this should come, the present advice would not be needless. Nothing lasts forever, nothing “wins out in the end.” There is always a rebeginning, and even if we ourselves do not learn in time the knack of living together in large numbers, and solving the problems that our best gifts create, at least the future archeologist will find it written that our century, coming after time of systematic mechanism, proclaimed in a hundred ways that men have minds, and that purposeless work is not for the sane.
Jacques Barzun, Darwin, Marx, Wager: Critique of a Heritage, 1941

　The conclusion of Jacques Barzun's work mentioned above appears to resonate strangely with the conclusion of Max Weber's renowned work. Yet Max Weber does not seem to be referenced in Barzun's book.

Max Weber から Jacques Barzun へ

Niemand weiß noch, wer künftig in jenem Gehäuse wohnen wird und ob am Ende dieser ungeheuren Entwicklung ganz neue Propheten oder eine mächtige Wiedergeburt alter Gedanken und Ideale stehen werden, oder aber - wenn keins von beiden - mechanisierte Versteinerung, mit einer Art von krampfhaftem Sich - wichtig - nehmen verbrämt. Dann allerdings könnte für die »letzten Menschen« dieser Kulturentwicklung das Wort zur Wahrheit werden: »Fachmenschen ohne Geist, Genußmenschen ohne Herz: dies Nichts bildet sich ein, eine nie vorher erreichte Stufe des Menschentums erstiegen zu haben.«
Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1920
将来この鉄の檻の中に住むものは誰なのか。そして、この巨大な発展が終わるとき、まったく新しい預言者たちが現れるのか、あるいはかつての思想や理想の力強い復活が起こるのか、それとも ―そのどちらでもなくて― 一種の異常な尊大さで粉飾された機械的化石と化することになるのか、まだ誰にも分らない。それはそれとして、こうした文化発展の最後に現われる「末人たち」»letzten Menschen«にとっては、次の言葉が真理となるのではなかろうか。「精神のない専門人、心情のない享楽人。この無のものは、人間性のかつて達したことのない段階にまですでに登りつめた、と自惚れるだろう」と。
マックス・ヴェーバー著（大塚久雄訳）『プロテスタンティズムの倫理と資本主義の精神』1989年岩波文庫、p.366
　

Even if this should come, the present advice would not be needless. Nothing lasts forever, nothing “wins out in the end.” There is always a rebeginning, and even if we ourselves do not learn in time the knack of living together in large numbers, and solving the problems that our best gifts create, at least the future archeologist will find it written that our century, coming after time of systematic mechanism, proclaimed in a hundred ways that men have minds, and that purposeless work is not for the sane.
Jacques Barzun, Darwin, Marx, Wager: Critique of a Heritage, 1941

万一、そのようなことが起こるとしても、いまここでいった忠告は無用ではないだろう。いかなることも永久にはつづかない。〝結局うまくやり遂げる〟ものなど、なにもありはしない。つねに再出発がある。たとえわたしたち自身がわれひと共に大勢で生き、わたしたちの最良の才能が生み出すいろいろな問題を解決する骨を学ぶのは、ついに間に合わないとしても、少なくとも未来の考古学者が、体系的機械論の時代のあとにつづいたわたしたちの世紀は、人間には精神があり、目的なき仕事は正気の者がすることではないと、さまざまな形で宣言していたのを、古文書の残欠かなにかのなかに発見することだろう。
ジャック・バーザン著（野島秀勝訳）『ダーウィン、マルクス、ヴァーグナー： 知的遺産の批判』1999年法政大学出版局、p.482

　上記の Jacques Barzun著作の末尾は、Max Weber の高名な著作の末尾と妙に呼応しているように観察されます。そのBarzunの書には、Max Weber は参照されてはいない（よう）ですが。 

Thought as an Apparatus: A Tentative Reflection

Homo sapiens is an intrinsically vulnerable being. Both body and mind are finite, and we do not originally possess the cognitive or psychological stamina required to endure the full complexity of the world as it is. Every day we live surrounded by events we cannot fully comprehend, by uncertain futures, uncontrollable others, and by the unavoidable realities of birth, aging, illness, and death.

In order to endure such excessive complexity, human beings have invented various historical resources. One of them is thought itself. Thought is not truth as such; rather, it may be understood as an interface installed between ourselves and the world — a kind of device or Apparat. It simplifies reality, compresses meaning, and provides orientation for action. In this sense, thought functions as a cognitive auxiliary mechanism that operates precisely because human beings are incapable of grasping the totality of the world.

Yet any apparatus becomes dangerous precisely when it works too well. When a system of thought offers the comforting feeling that the world has become intelligible — when history appears meaningful and the direction of the future seems clear — people easily become intoxicated by its usability. A coherent explanatory framework imposes far less psychological burden than an ambiguous and complex reality. Thus thought gradually transforms itself: from an instrument of inquiry into a source of reassurance, and eventually into doctrine claiming exclusive legitimacy.

Human freedom, however, does not arise from the disappearance of constraints. We are thrown into the world without choosing the place of our birth, our historical moment, or even our own bodies. Historical constraints always precede us. And yet — or rather, precisely because of this — human beings are capable of continuously adding meaning within the conditions already given. Freedom may therefore lie not in unlimited choice, but in the capacity to respond from within the indwelling accumulation of inherited past trajectories.

The difficulty lies in the fact that sustaining intellectual patience — resisting premature conclusions and enduring the state of “not knowing” — demands immense mental energy. When this stamina is exhausted, we seek refuge in systems that provide rapid explanations. At that very moment, thought ceases to be a resource for exploration and turns instead into an apparatus that fixes reality.

What matters, perhaps, is not the absence of thought, but the refusal to become intoxicated by it. Thought must be treated not as a final answer, but as a provisional tool through which finite beings may continue their engagement with the world.
In truth, sages and fools are equal in this respect. For, as John Stuart Mill famously observed, what any of us can possess is at best only a half-truth.
Such intellectual modesty may well be the minimum condition under which vulnerable human beings can nevertheless remain free.

※See,
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,Und Grün des Lebens goldner Baum.(Mephistopheles): 本に溺れたい

思想という装置について

homo sapiens は、きわめて脆弱な存在です。身体も脳も有限であり、世界の複雑さをそのまま受け止め続けるだけの認知的・精神的体力を本来的に備えてはいません。私たちは日々、理解しきれない出来事、不確実な未来、制御不能な他者、そして不可避の生老病死に囲まれて生きています。

この過剰な複雑性に耐えるために、人間はさまざまな歴史資源を発明してきました。その一つが「思想」です。思想とは真理そのものというより、むしろ世界とのあいだに設置された一種の interface、あるいは device／Apparat と呼ぶべきものではないでしょうか。それは世界を単純化し、意味を圧縮し、行為の方向を与えます。言い換えれば、思想とは、人間が世界の全体を理解できないという事実を前提として作動する認知的補助装置なのです。

しかし装置は、有効であればあるほど危険でもあります。ある思想が世界を見通せる感覚を与え、歴史の意味や未来の方向を明快に説明してくれるとき、人はしばしばその「使用感」に酔ってしまいます。複雑で曖昧な現実よりも、整然とした説明体系のほうが精神的負荷ははるかに小さいからです。こうして思想は、思考の道具から安心の拠り所へ、さらに正統性を独占する教義へと変質していきます。

しかし本来、人間の自由とは、制約の消滅によって生まれるものではありません。私たちは、生まれる場所も時代も身体も選ぶことなく、この世界へ投げ込まれます。歴史的 constraints は常に先行しています。それにもかかわらず、いやむしろそれゆえに、人間は与えられた条件の内部で意味を継ぎ足し続けることができます。自由とは、無制約の選択可能性ではなく、繰り越されてきた過去履歴の indwelling のうちに応答する能力なのではないでしょうか。

問題は、世界の複雑さに対して結論を急がず、「わからない」という状態を保留し続ける知的体力が、人間にとってきわめて消耗的である点にあります。体力が尽きたとき、人は説明の速い体系へと避難します。そしてその瞬間、思想は探究の資源から、現実を固定する装置へと転化してしまいます。

おそらく重要なのは、思想を持たないことではありません。思想に酔わないことです。すなわち、それを最終的解答としてではなく、有限な存在が世界と関わり続けるための暫定的な道具として扱い続けることです。賢者も愚者も実は平等なのです。なぜなら、私たちが持てるのは、J. S. Mill が喝破したように、せいぜい「half truth」なのですから。その慎みこそが、脆弱な存在である人間が、なお自由であり続けるための最低条件なのではないでしょうか。

※参照
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,Und Grün des Lebens goldner Baum.(Mephistopheles): 本に溺れたい
「一切の理論は灰色であり、現実という黄金の木こそが緑なのだよ」