Charles Sanders Peirce’s assessment of Hegel (2)

Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to steer its course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. Hegel first made the world understand this; and he seeks to make logic not merely the subjective guide and monitor of thought, which was all it had been ambitioning before, but to be the vert mainspring of thinking, and not merely of individual thinking but of discussion, of the history of the development of thought, of all history, of all development.
Charles S. Peirce, 'Evolutionary Love' (1891), Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays, edited and introduced by Morris R. Cohen, with an essay by John Dewey, introduction to the Bison Books Edition by Kenneth Laine Ketner, 1998, Univ. of Nebraska Press, p.294 (Reprint of 1923 ed. by Harcourt, Brace and World)

The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient. Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might have looked up to him as the treat vindicator of their truth. (Of course, the external trappings of his doctrine are only here and there of much significance.) For pragmaticism belongs essentially to the triadic class of philosophical doctrines, and is much more essentially so than Hegelianism is. (Indeed, in one passage, at least, Hegel alludes to the triadic from his exposition as to a mere fashion of dress.) 
Charles S. Peirce, 'What Pragmatism Is' (1902), Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance), edited, with an introduction and Notes by Phlip P. Weiner, 1966, Dover, p.202

　Just reading the above doesn’t make much sense. According to Shunpei Ueyama’s commentary in the Japanese edition of the anthology, the situation is as follows: When considering both the logical unfolding and the temporal development of a system, formal logic can describe only the logical unfolding. In formal logic, temporal development cannot, in principle, be described. And it seems that Hegel’s dialectic is valued as the descriptive logic for this latter aspect—the temporal development of a system.

※Please also refer to the following.
Two approaches to the Emergence