「生成」から「形式」へ：20C.西欧思想における螺旋構造／From “Generation” to “Form”: The Helix Structure in Early 20th-Century Western Thought

Imagism を、Joyce、Pound、Eliot、と並べて、発見的線引きをしてみると、

Joyce vs. Pound - Eliot

と引けると思われます。

Finnegans Wake は、言葉を次から次へと生成する万華鏡のような世界ですし、Eliot は根本的には古典主義的、形式主義的で、Pound や Eliot が ’Noh’ に着目したのも、その形式美的な統一性です。

もし、Joyce 的 modernism を「生成」とするなら、PoundーEliot 的 modernism は、「形式」と捉え得る。そして、同時期に活躍した、Wittgenstein の前期から後期への履歴的変貌は、「形式」から「生成」と見なせる。そうだとすると、20C.初頭の modernism（imagism）の共時的分節化は、Wittgenstein という一人の哲学者においては、履歴的（通時的）遷移として表出した、と言えるでしょう。

また、この20世紀初頭の思想潮流の、《形式 vs. 生成》の分岐は、Stephen Toulmin が指摘した、以下の、16C. Montaigne的「近代」から三十年戦争を経て17C. Descartes的「近代」への再編成という事態が、19C末の人文主義再興からWWⅠを経て論理実証主義指向へと歴史的に再演（Mimesis）されたのだと考えてよいと思います。

Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis, Chicago, 1990　〔スティーヴン・トゥールミン『近代とは何か』2001年、法政大学出版局〕

By 1910, culture and society in Western Europe were on the verge of returning to the world of political moderation and human tolerance which was the dream of Henri de Navarre and Michael de Montaigne. Given this material, the 1910s and 1920s might have seen a definitive demolition of the modern scaffolding. (p.151) 〔pp.245-6〕

By the standards of our narrative, then, those who led the intellectual and cultural response to the disaster of the First World War chose not to move in a humanistic direction but rather to return to formalism. In a dozen areas, late 19th-century artists and thinkers had explored those areas that the first generations of “moderns” most undervalued: history and psychology, notably the psychology of the emotions. For forty years after 1920, the tide went into reverse. (p.153)〔p.248〕

Charles Sanders Peirce’s assessment of Hegel (2)

Internal anancasm, or logical groping, which advances upon a predestined line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to steer its course, this is the rule of development of philosophy. Hegel first made the world understand this; and he seeks to make logic not merely the subjective guide and monitor of thought, which was all it had been ambitioning before, but to be the vert mainspring of thinking, and not merely of individual thinking but of discussion, of the history of the development of thought, of all history, of all development.
Charles S. Peirce, 'Evolutionary Love' (1891), Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays, edited and introduced by Morris R. Cohen, with an essay by John Dewey, introduction to the Bison Books Edition by Kenneth Laine Ketner, 1998, Univ. of Nebraska Press, p.294 (Reprint of 1923 ed. by Harcourt, Brace and World)

The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient. Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of contempt, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might have looked up to him as the treat vindicator of their truth. (Of course, the external trappings of his doctrine are only here and there of much significance.) For pragmaticism belongs essentially to the triadic class of philosophical doctrines, and is much more essentially so than Hegelianism is. (Indeed, in one passage, at least, Hegel alludes to the triadic from his exposition as to a mere fashion of dress.) 
Charles S. Peirce, 'What Pragmatism Is' (1902), Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance), edited, with an introduction and Notes by Phlip P. Weiner, 1966, Dover, p.202

　Just reading the above doesn’t make much sense. According to Shunpei Ueyama’s commentary in the Japanese edition of the anthology, the situation is as follows: When considering both the logical unfolding and the temporal development of a system, formal logic can describe only the logical unfolding. In formal logic, temporal development cannot, in principle, be described. And it seems that Hegel’s dialectic is valued as the descriptive logic for this latter aspect—the temporal development of a system.

※Please also refer to the following.
Two approaches to the Emergence

Two approaches to emergence

　Emergence refers to the behavior of a system that cannot be logically derived from the sum of the regular and simple behaviors of the elements that make up that system.

　When considering emergence, I believe there are two prominent approaches: “evolutionary theory” and “dialectics.”

１）The Theory of Evolution
　W. James interpreted the theoretical essence of evolutionary theory as follows.
　He stated that, in Darwinism, the two processes of “mutation” and “natural selection” are regarded as independent, unrelated phenomena. In other words, W. James understood Darwinism to be a theory that links two distinct types of change occurring in nature while keeping them separate.

２）Dialectics
　Peirce, the father of pragmatism and its greatest theorist, stated, “Even if it is dressed in strange garb, my philosophy is a revival of Hegelian philosophy.” It appears that Peirce valued dialectics as a methodological approach for describing the behavior of a system evolving over time. Furthermore, the pragmatist John Dewey was a Hegelian in his youth.

　Whether we are talking about “evolutionary theory” or “dialectics,” it is reasonable to expect that they share a deep theoretical affinity with pragmatism. Or rather, it seems possible to use pragmatism as a bridge to connect “evolutionary theory” and “dialectics” theoretically. Furthermore, my current prediction is that this could represent a significant breakthrough for contemporary systems theory.

[See] Our article below
The essence of Darwinism(Japanese Version)
Charles Sanders Peirce’s assessment of Hegel

From Max Weber to Jacques Barzun

Niemand weiß noch, wer künftig in jenem Gehäuse wohnen wird und ob am Ende dieser ungeheuren Entwicklung ganz neue Propheten oder eine mächtige Wiedergeburt alter Gedanken und Ideale stehen werden, oder aber - wenn keins von beiden - mechanisierte Versteinerung, mit einer Art von krampfhaftem Sich - wichtig - nehmen verbrämt. Dann allerdings könnte für die »letzten Menschen« dieser Kulturentwicklung das Wort zur Wahrheit werden: »Fachmenschen ohne Geist, Genußmenschen ohne Herz: dies Nichts bildet sich ein, eine nie vorher erreichte Stufe des Menschentums erstiegen zu haben.«
Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1920

Even if this should come, the present advice would not be needless. Nothing lasts forever, nothing “wins out in the end.” There is always a rebeginning, and even if we ourselves do not learn in time the knack of living together in large numbers, and solving the problems that our best gifts create, at least the future archeologist will find it written that our century, coming after time of systematic mechanism, proclaimed in a hundred ways that men have minds, and that purposeless work is not for the sane.
Jacques Barzun, Darwin, Marx, Wager: Critique of a Heritage, 1941

　The conclusion of Jacques Barzun's work mentioned above appears to resonate strangely with the conclusion of Max Weber's renowned work. Yet Max Weber does not seem to be referenced in Barzun's book.

Max Weber から Jacques Barzun へ

Niemand weiß noch, wer künftig in jenem Gehäuse wohnen wird und ob am Ende dieser ungeheuren Entwicklung ganz neue Propheten oder eine mächtige Wiedergeburt alter Gedanken und Ideale stehen werden, oder aber - wenn keins von beiden - mechanisierte Versteinerung, mit einer Art von krampfhaftem Sich - wichtig - nehmen verbrämt. Dann allerdings könnte für die »letzten Menschen« dieser Kulturentwicklung das Wort zur Wahrheit werden: »Fachmenschen ohne Geist, Genußmenschen ohne Herz: dies Nichts bildet sich ein, eine nie vorher erreichte Stufe des Menschentums erstiegen zu haben.«
Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, 1920
将来この鉄の檻の中に住むものは誰なのか。そして、この巨大な発展が終わるとき、まったく新しい預言者たちが現れるのか、あるいはかつての思想や理想の力強い復活が起こるのか、それとも ―そのどちらでもなくて― 一種の異常な尊大さで粉飾された機械的化石と化することになるのか、まだ誰にも分らない。それはそれとして、こうした文化発展の最後に現われる「末人たち」»letzten Menschen«にとっては、次の言葉が真理となるのではなかろうか。「精神のない専門人、心情のない享楽人。この無のものは、人間性のかつて達したことのない段階にまですでに登りつめた、と自惚れるだろう」と。
マックス・ヴェーバー著（大塚久雄訳）『プロテスタンティズムの倫理と資本主義の精神』1989年岩波文庫、p.366
　

Even if this should come, the present advice would not be needless. Nothing lasts forever, nothing “wins out in the end.” There is always a rebeginning, and even if we ourselves do not learn in time the knack of living together in large numbers, and solving the problems that our best gifts create, at least the future archeologist will find it written that our century, coming after time of systematic mechanism, proclaimed in a hundred ways that men have minds, and that purposeless work is not for the sane.
Jacques Barzun, Darwin, Marx, Wager: Critique of a Heritage, 1941

万一、そのようなことが起こるとしても、いまここでいった忠告は無用ではないだろう。いかなることも永久にはつづかない。〝結局うまくやり遂げる〟ものなど、なにもありはしない。つねに再出発がある。たとえわたしたち自身がわれひと共に大勢で生き、わたしたちの最良の才能が生み出すいろいろな問題を解決する骨を学ぶのは、ついに間に合わないとしても、少なくとも未来の考古学者が、体系的機械論の時代のあとにつづいたわたしたちの世紀は、人間には精神があり、目的なき仕事は正気の者がすることではないと、さまざまな形で宣言していたのを、古文書の残欠かなにかのなかに発見することだろう。
ジャック・バーザン著（野島秀勝訳）『ダーウィン、マルクス、ヴァーグナー： 知的遺産の批判』1999年法政大学出版局、p.482

　上記の Jacques Barzun著作の末尾は、Max Weber の高名な著作の末尾と妙に呼応しているように観察されます。そのBarzunの書には、Max Weber は参照されてはいない（よう）ですが。 

Thought as an Apparatus: A Tentative Reflection

Homo sapiens is an intrinsically vulnerable being. Both body and mind are finite, and we do not originally possess the cognitive or psychological stamina required to endure the full complexity of the world as it is. Every day we live surrounded by events we cannot fully comprehend, by uncertain futures, uncontrollable others, and by the unavoidable realities of birth, aging, illness, and death.

In order to endure such excessive complexity, human beings have invented various historical resources. One of them is thought itself. Thought is not truth as such; rather, it may be understood as an interface installed between ourselves and the world — a kind of device or Apparat. It simplifies reality, compresses meaning, and provides orientation for action. In this sense, thought functions as a cognitive auxiliary mechanism that operates precisely because human beings are incapable of grasping the totality of the world.

Yet any apparatus becomes dangerous precisely when it works too well. When a system of thought offers the comforting feeling that the world has become intelligible — when history appears meaningful and the direction of the future seems clear — people easily become intoxicated by its usability. A coherent explanatory framework imposes far less psychological burden than an ambiguous and complex reality. Thus thought gradually transforms itself: from an instrument of inquiry into a source of reassurance, and eventually into doctrine claiming exclusive legitimacy.

Human freedom, however, does not arise from the disappearance of constraints. We are thrown into the world without choosing the place of our birth, our historical moment, or even our own bodies. Historical constraints always precede us. And yet — or rather, precisely because of this — human beings are capable of continuously adding meaning within the conditions already given. Freedom may therefore lie not in unlimited choice, but in the capacity to respond from within the indwelling accumulation of inherited past trajectories.

The difficulty lies in the fact that sustaining intellectual patience — resisting premature conclusions and enduring the state of “not knowing” — demands immense mental energy. When this stamina is exhausted, we seek refuge in systems that provide rapid explanations. At that very moment, thought ceases to be a resource for exploration and turns instead into an apparatus that fixes reality.

What matters, perhaps, is not the absence of thought, but the refusal to become intoxicated by it. Thought must be treated not as a final answer, but as a provisional tool through which finite beings may continue their engagement with the world.
In truth, sages and fools are equal in this respect. For, as John Stuart Mill famously observed, what any of us can possess is at best only a half-truth.
Such intellectual modesty may well be the minimum condition under which vulnerable human beings can nevertheless remain free.

※See,
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,Und Grün des Lebens goldner Baum.(Mephistopheles): 本に溺れたい

思想という装置について

homo sapiens は、きわめて脆弱な存在です。身体も脳も有限であり、世界の複雑さをそのまま受け止め続けるだけの認知的・精神的体力を本来的に備えてはいません。私たちは日々、理解しきれない出来事、不確実な未来、制御不能な他者、そして不可避の生老病死に囲まれて生きています。

この過剰な複雑性に耐えるために、人間はさまざまな歴史資源を発明してきました。その一つが「思想」です。思想とは真理そのものというより、むしろ世界とのあいだに設置された一種の interface、あるいは device／Apparat と呼ぶべきものではないでしょうか。それは世界を単純化し、意味を圧縮し、行為の方向を与えます。言い換えれば、思想とは、人間が世界の全体を理解できないという事実を前提として作動する認知的補助装置なのです。

しかし装置は、有効であればあるほど危険でもあります。ある思想が世界を見通せる感覚を与え、歴史の意味や未来の方向を明快に説明してくれるとき、人はしばしばその「使用感」に酔ってしまいます。複雑で曖昧な現実よりも、整然とした説明体系のほうが精神的負荷ははるかに小さいからです。こうして思想は、思考の道具から安心の拠り所へ、さらに正統性を独占する教義へと変質していきます。

しかし本来、人間の自由とは、制約の消滅によって生まれるものではありません。私たちは、生まれる場所も時代も身体も選ぶことなく、この世界へ投げ込まれます。歴史的 constraints は常に先行しています。それにもかかわらず、いやむしろそれゆえに、人間は与えられた条件の内部で意味を継ぎ足し続けることができます。自由とは、無制約の選択可能性ではなく、繰り越されてきた過去履歴の indwelling のうちに応答する能力なのではないでしょうか。

問題は、世界の複雑さに対して結論を急がず、「わからない」という状態を保留し続ける知的体力が、人間にとってきわめて消耗的である点にあります。体力が尽きたとき、人は説明の速い体系へと避難します。そしてその瞬間、思想は探究の資源から、現実を固定する装置へと転化してしまいます。

おそらく重要なのは、思想を持たないことではありません。思想に酔わないことです。すなわち、それを最終的解答としてではなく、有限な存在が世界と関わり続けるための暫定的な道具として扱い続けることです。賢者も愚者も実は平等なのです。なぜなら、私たちが持てるのは、J. S. Mill が喝破したように、せいぜい「half truth」なのですから。その慎みこそが、脆弱な存在である人間が、なお自由であり続けるための最低条件なのではないでしょうか。

※参照
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,Und Grün des Lebens goldner Baum.(Mephistopheles): 本に溺れたい
「一切の理論は灰色であり、現実という黄金の木こそが緑なのだよ」

Machina ex Deus: A Machine Made of “God,” or a Tale of Substitution between “God” and “Human Beings”

I. A Pious Beginning

The natural philosophers of the seventeenth century were by no means superficial rationalists.
On the contrary, they were deeply pious, sincere, and diligent in their inquiries.

For example, Descartes sought to guarantee the certainty of natural knowledge by linking human reason to divine perfection.
Newton, for his part, devoted a substantial portion of his life to theological studies.

For them, the investigation of natural laws was an attempt to read the order of God.

There is little reason to doubt the sincerity of their motivation.

II. Faith That Succeeded Too Well

However, the real problem begins here.

Their project succeeded too well.Nature came to be described by equations, modeled,  reproduced, predicted, and controlled. Divine order was gradually translated into theories, devices, and institutions.

And when that translation was completed, it was no longer God. It had become an object of human management.

This transformation may not have been clearly recognized by those who lived through it.

III. From Deus ex Machina to Machina ex Deus

In classical drama, there is a device known as Deus ex Machina, ‘god from the machinery.’ When a story reaches an impasse, a god suddenly intervenes and resolves it.

Modernity reversed this structure.　While it claimed that God had designed the world, it may in fact have transformed God into a set of design specifications.

This reversal gave rise to what may be called Machina ex Deus, a “machine born of God.” God was transformed from an object of worship into a theoretical resource, a design principle, and a source of power.

God did not disappear. God was mechanized.

INTERMEZZO

At this point, a brief clarification may be helpful.

The great project of rationalizing the world in the seventeenth century produced unintended consequences. It may have resulted in what could be called a “theology without God,” under the name of science. Or would it be too ironic to call it a “theology that no longer needs God”?

 

IV. Human-Centeredness in the Name of Reason

Behind this process lies a major current that dates back to humanism. The current is from “divine sovereignty” to “human sovereignty.”

It is the belief that human beings are masters of themselves.

To understand nature was to dominate nature.
To dominate nature was to establish human sovereignty.

Science, in this sense, may also be understood as a declaration of human sovereignty, disguised in theological form.

This aspect should not be underestimated.

 

V. Einstein’s Discomfort

This structure remained alive even in the twentieth century.

Einstein’s famous remark,

“God does not play dice,”

was not merely a metaphor.

It was a kind of confession of faith:
the belief that the world must ultimately conform to reason.

The indeterminacy introduced by quantum theory challenged not only physical theory,
but also this rationalistic conception of God.

Einstein was unable to fully accept it.

He was, in this respect, an extremely sincere modern thinker.

 

VI. Courteous Heretics

There were thinkers who felt discomfort with this structure.

Pascal, Nietzsche, and Simone Weil may be regarded as representative figures.

They respected reason, took religion seriously, and yet betrayed both.

They did not engage in loud denunciation. Instead, they questioned their age with excessive politeness.

For that very reason, their thought was dangerous.

 

VII. Laws as a Magic Wand

If “laws are substitutes for ignorance,” then scientific laws are, in essence, no more than tools to compensate for human finitude.

They were provisional supports for beings unable to grasp the world completely.

They are unnecessary for God,
and necessary only for human beings.

In this sense, laws originally resembled crutches.

However, this auxiliary tool gradually took on another form.

Laws came to represent omnipotence:

With this, the world can be understood.
With this, the future can be predicted.
With this, everything can be managed.

Thus, crutches were transformed into a magic wand.

A magic wand should be controlled by the skill and restraint of its user. But once it is worshipped as omnipotent, the relationship is reversed. Human beings no longer use the wand. The wand uses human beings.

Laws cease to be auxiliary tools and become objects of reverence in themselves. As a result, human beings forget their own finitude. What was meant to be controlled becomes uncontrollable. What was meant to explain becomes a mechanism of domination. Means of understanding turn into ends in themselves. This resembles the runaway process in “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice.”

Once activated, the system can no longer be stopped. It continues to operate through self-amplification.

Machina ex Deus may be understood as the systematic organization of this form of forgetting. Human beings become dominated by the very tools they created to compensate for their weakness.

 

VIII. The Threshold between Love and Hatred

This essay does not seek to deny modernity. We all live within its benefits.

At the same time, modernity has simplified the world, eliminated the incalculable, pathologized uncertainty, and elevated manageability to the highest value.

To love it and fear it at the same time. Any critique that fails to accept this duality will remain a mere gesture.

 

IX. Conclusion: Where Has God Gone?

God has not died. God has been decomposed into equations, models, algorithms, and institutions. And in this form, God continues to exist.

This is Machina ex Deus.

Modernity may be understood as an attempt to turn human beings into gods by means of God. It is a great and dangerous project, and one that remains unfinished.

We live inside this apparatus. Therefore, we must voice its structure, politely, and yet without restraint. With the freezing innocence of the boy in Andersen's fairy tale. “The emperor has no clothes.”

Vergleichstabelle Poincaré / Bergson / Peirce

Bereitstellung von ChatGPT

Kategorie	Jules-Henri Poincaré (1854–1912)	Henri Bergson (1859–1941)	Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914)
Hauptwerke	La Science et l’hypothèse (1902); La Valeur de la Science (1905); Science et Méthode (1908)	Zeit und Freiheit (1889); Schöpferische Entwicklung (1907)	„The Fixation of Belief“ (1877); „How to Make Our Ideas Clear“ (1878)
Zentrales Interesse	Grundlagen von Mathematik und Physik; „Konventionalismus“ der Theoriewahl	Philosophie von Zeit, Leben und Intuition – Kritik am Mechanismus	Logik der Erkenntnis, Zeichentheorie und Fallibilismus
Erkenntnis-theoretische Position	Erfahrung leitet, aber determiniert Theorie nicht; Theorien werden nach Zweckmäßigkeit gewählt (pragmatischer Konstruktivismus)	Intuition erfasst den Fluss des Lebens; Zeit als schöpferische Dauer (durée)	Wissen als Kette fehlbarer Hypothesen; Wahrheit entsteht in gemeinschaftlicher Forschung
Wahrheits- begriff	Keine absolute Wahrheit, sondern „die vorteilhafteste Theorie“	Wahrheit als Prozess, nicht als statische Behauptung	Wahrheit als revidierbarer Glaubensbestand, offen für Korrektur
Erfahrungs-begriff	Erfahrung liefert Kontext, nicht Zwang, für die Theoriewahl	Erfahrung als Teilnahme am Lebensfluss, nicht analytisch sondern intuitiv	Erfahrung als experimentelles Feld; entwickelt sich durch Zeichen und Schlussfolgerung
Sicht der Erkenntnis-Evolution	Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis entwickelt sich durch pragmatische Auswahl; Fitness = empirischer Erfolg	Bewusstsein entwickelt sich wie das Leben selbst schöpferisch	Erkenntnis entwickelt sich durch Versuch, Irrtum und Korrektur
Methodische Merkmale	Verbindung von mathematischer Strenge und philosophischer Reflexion	Intuitionismus und antimechanistischer Vitalismus	Integration von Semiotik, Logik und Pragmatismus
Geistiges Erbe	Neukantianismus, Konstruktivismus, Wissenschaftsphilosophie	Phänomenologie, Prozessphilosophie, Lebensphilosophie	Pragmatismus, Zeichentheorie, Analytische Philosophie, Kognitionswissenschaft
Bezug zu Ihrem Essay	Entspricht Ihrer These „Sprache als adaptives Interface“: Theorien als Anpassungsstrukturen	Dient als Gegenpol: „Leben vor der Sprache“ beleuchtet die sprachliche Grenze	Erweitert Ihr Thema durch „Sprache als System von Erkenntnis und Fehlerkorrektur“

Comparative Table: Poincaré / Bergson / Peirce

Provision of ChatGPT

Category	Jules-Henri Poincaré (1854–1912)	Henri Bergson (1859–1941)	Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914)
Major Works	La Science et l’hypothèse (1902); La Valeur de la Science (1905); Science et Méthode (1908)	Time and Free Will (1889); Creative Evolution (1907)	“The Fixation of Belief” (1877); “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878)
Central Concern	Foundations of mathematics and physics; “conventionalism” in theory choice	Philosophy of time, life, and intuition (critique of mechanism)	Logic of inquiry, semiotics, and fallibilism
Epistemological Position	Experience guides but does not determine theory; theories are chosen for convenience and efficacy (pragmatic constructivism)	Intuition grasps the flow of life; time as creative duration (durée)	Knowledge is a chain of fallible hypotheses; truth emerges via communal inquiry
Concept of Truth	Not absolute truth but “the most advantageous theory”	Truth as process, not static proposition	Truth as revisable belief, open to correction
Concept of Experience	Experience provides context, not constraint, for theory selection	Experience as part of the living flow; participatory rather than analytical	Experience as experimental field for inquiry; evolves through signs and reasoning
View of Cognitive Evolution	Scientific knowledge evolves through pragmatic selection; fitness = empirical success	Consciousness evolves creatively, as life does	Knowledge evolves through trial, error, and correction
Methodological Feature	Fusion of mathematical rigor and philosophical reflection	Intuitionism and anti-mechanistic vitalism	Integration of semiotics, logic, and pragmatism
Intellectual Legacy	Neo-Kantianism, structuralism, philosophy of science	Phenomenology, process philosophy, vitalism	Pragmatism, semiotics, analytic philosophy, cognitive science
Connection to Your Essay	Resonates with your view of “language as adaptive interface”: theories as adaptive constructs	Serves as counterpoint: “life before language” illuminates the linguistic boundary	Extends your theme via “language as inquiry and error-correction system”