This article is a private posting of the entry “Epistemology” from the second edition of the Heibonsha World Encyclopedia (1999).
When I happened to glance at this entry, I was impressed by its excellent content and wondered who had written it. Upon checking the author, I learned that it was the late Kuroda Wataru (philosopher, October 21, 1928 – May 31, 1989), which made perfect sense.
As expected, it provides a concise overview of Western philosophy while touching on interesting topics, and concludes by presenting the contemporary significance and challenges of epistemology. This provides a truly wonderful perspective on epistemology.
The quotations in this article are copyrighted and are only partially available online (without attribution). Therefore, even for personal use, posting the entire text on this blog would constitute a violation of copyright law. However, it would be a great shame for this valuable insight to remain buried within an encyclopedia entry. Therefore, until the copyright holder requests its removal, I have decided to post it on this blog as a fan of Wataru Kuroda (discreetly).
The following points in Kuroda Wataru's “Epistemology” struck me as interesting and important.
The following is a quote.
Epistemology / Heibonsha World Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition (1999) / Written by Wataru Kuroda
epistemology[en]
Erkenntnistheorie[de]
épistémologie[fr]
Epistemology refers to the philosophical study or theory concerning the nature, origin, grounds, and limits of knowledge. The English and French terms translated as "epistemology" are derived from the Greek words epistēmē (knowledge) and logos (theory). Although these terms only came into widespread use in the mid-19th century, the philosophical inquiry into knowledge dates back much further. For instance, in classical Greece, the Sophists’ theory of relativistic truth already included a fairly advanced epistemological reflection. Socrates, too, in his dialogical activities, vigorously discussed the nature of knowledge and the methods of acquiring it.
Plato and Aristotle
Plato gave systematic expression to the epistemological concerns that had thus been deepened, thereby determining the direction of subsequent development. He distinguished between two types of intellectual activity: epistēmē (knowledge) and doxa (opinion or belief). Knowledge, according to Plato, is something that cannot be erroneous—it must be well-founded and demonstrable, unlike mere opinion or belief, which may happen to be true but lacks adequate justification. Plato’s final formulation of the definition of "knowledge" was "true belief accompanied by a logos (rational account)." He left to later generations the task of thoroughly exploring the implications of the distinction between "knowledge" and "opinion."
Aristotle, likewise a philosopher of great significance in the history of epistemology, systematized the rules of deductive reasoning and laid the foundations of classical formal logic at an early stage. He also conducted detailed investigations into mental faculties related to knowledge—such as sensation, memory, imagination, and thought.
The views of Plato and Aristotle on knowledge differ considerably, and the contrast between them parallels the later opposition between rationalism and empiricism in modern philosophy.
New Developments Since Early Modernity and Their Background
For Western Christian thinkers, it became an important intellectual challenge to clarify the boundary and interrelation between supernatural truths revealed through divine revelation and knowledge acquired through the use of reason. In the Middle Ages in particular, epistemological inquiry was essentially framed by the question of how to reconcile faith and reason.
With the advent of modernity, the rapid progress of science shattered the inertial stability of traditional thought and spurred a transformation in the worldview. Many epistemological problems emerged from the tension between science and philosophy, and the development of epistemology from the early modern period to the present cannot be understood apart from this relationship.
Nonetheless, philosophical inquiry into knowledge largely unfolded along the trajectory laid out by Plato. The central concern became: What does it mean to know? This question was recast as: What are the grounds that make a claim to knowledge valid? Under what conditions are our thoughts and beliefs justified as genuine knowledge? Epistemology thus came to focus on the problem of justification in approaching the essence of knowledge.
In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant stated that his investigation concerns the quid juris (the question of right) regarding knowledge, not the quid facti (the question of fact)—a remark that succinctly expresses the fundamental orientation of Western epistemological research.
John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published at the end of the 17th century, is a classical work representative of early modern epistemology. As its introduction makes clear, the work seeks to investigate the origin of the certainty and clarity of knowledge, examine the nature and grounds of probabilistic "opinion" or "belief," and thereby clarify the boundary between the two. This book, which largely oriented modern philosophy toward epistemological concerns, inherits the Platonic ideal of knowledge and centers its inquiry around the question of justification.
In early modern philosophy, it is customary to distinguish two major streams of epistemology: rationalism and empiricism, whose opposition reflects the intellectual climate of the time.
During this period, researchers in the natural sciences began to achieve results using an empirical and inductive method that rejected existing conceptual frameworks and classifications of being, and instead pursued laws of experience through observation and experimentation. Moreover, the method of analysis and synthesis (as in Galileo), which decomposed phenomena into simple factors and reconstructed them in terms of functional relationships, presented a new mechanistic worldview and demonstrated the efficacy of the hypothetical-deductive method. This also coincided with significant advances in mathematical analysis.
In response to this intellectual environment, the rationalists emphasized a priori methods of knowing—deducing logical consequences from a few self-evident principles—and considered mathematics as the model of certain knowledge. Prominent philosophers who constructed epistemology using this method include Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz.
On the other hand, British philosophers such as Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume developed an empiricist epistemology (British empiricism), which placed emphasis on a posteriori methods—based on observation, experiment, and inductive generalization. They interpreted belief and knowledge through these methods and made it a principle to demand sensory evidence to support statements concerning the real world.
Kant
Kant deeply examined the issues contested between rationalism and empiricism and constructed a tightly integrated theoretical system that can be regarded as decisive in the interpretation of epistemological problems in early modern philosophy. The central question of Kant’s epistemology is summarized in the inquiry: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?
Put more plainly, Kant’s fundamental concern was: How can judgments that are both universal and necessary—thus deserving to be called knowledge—and that relate in some way to experience and reality, come into being? Moreover, how can their objective validity—that is, their conformity to reality—be established?
Kant’s position aligns with empiricist thought in that he limits the validity of knowledge to what is possible within the bounds of experience and rejects many of the traditional propositions of metaphysics. However, in making it his theoretical task to analyze the fundamental knowledge and conditions underlying contemporary mathematics and Newtonian mechanics, and to reconstruct the basic structure of possible experience on that basis, Kant also inherits and develops the legacy of early modern rationalism.
Kant’s epistemological position is known as transcendental idealism or transcendental subjectivism. According to his theory, the basic structure of nature—as the object of scientific knowledge—is determined by the forms of the subject, namely, the forms of sensibility and understanding (such as space and time, and the categories). Yet this subject is not the individual, empirical self, but rather the essential structure of consciousness that becomes clear only through philosophical reflection directed at the basis of empirical selfhood. It is the transcendental subject (transzendentales Subjekt), which may also be described as consciousness in general.
In this way, Kant established the modern philosophical method of investigating epistemological problems through the relation between subject and object—a method that became foundational to later thought. His influence on the history of epistemology is thus immense. His ideas attracted many followers and have been considered, especially in Germany, as the orthodox foundation of epistemology.
From the standpoint of scientific knowledge, however, Kant’s epistemology was inevitably subject to the limitations of his time. Furthermore, because he focused almost exclusively on mathematical natural science and paid little attention to the cognition of history and society, the limitations of his theory are evident.
After Kant, many efforts were made to remedy these deficiencies, and the scope of epistemological inquiry was greatly expanded. Nevertheless, it can still be said that no theory has yet emerged that decisively surpasses Kant's views concerning the aims and methods of epistemology, or the proper stance toward scientific knowledge.
The neo-Kantian epistemology that flourished from the late 19th to the early 20th century, as well as Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which rose to prominence afterward and became a leading school of thought, both essentially trace the outlines of Kant’s epistemological ideals.
Epistemology in the Contemporary Era
Today, however, it is no longer possible to remain within the framework of transcendental epistemology and its ideal of "grounding science." The relationship between science and philosophy concerning epistemological issues has undergone significant changes over the past two to three decades. For instance, rapid intellectual developments in fields such as cerebral physiology, genetic engineering, computer science, and robotics are drastically reshaping our interpretation of the subject–object relationship in cognition. In such a context, an epistemology that self-enclosedly concerns itself solely with the quid juris—the "question of right"—while bracketing off the insights from these fields as belonging merely to the quid facti—the "question of fact"—likely has little time left.
We must now ask anew: what is the significance of inquiring into the eternal and immutable structures of knowledge, while abstracting away from the historical and social conditions that concretely constrain our cognitive processes? In English-speaking countries, epistemology and philosophy of science conducted through the methods of linguistic analysis currently enjoy overwhelming dominance. Originally developed more by mathematicians and natural scientists reflecting on their own methodological and foundational practices than by professional philosophers, this analytic epistemology has generally—though only relatively—maintained its connection to scientific inquiry.
However, it should not be overlooked that the approach of this school, which focuses more on the linguistic frameworks through which facts are articulated than on the facts themselves, may also result in an unproductive division between questions of fact and of right—just as traditional epistemology often did.
Yet to conclude from such observations that epistemology has come to an end in our time would be short-sighted. The dismantling of transcendental epistemology and the disappearance of epistemology as such are not one and the same. The more specialized, sophisticated, and colossal scientific research and technology become, the more urgently we must reexamine the fundamental significance of scientific and technical knowledge for human life.
As Plato’s dialogue Charmides so beautifully expresses, it is not merely knowledge (epistēmē) but the knowledge of knowledge that constitutes a uniquely human endeavor. To pursue this most consciously and rigorously is the essential task of philosophy. Epistemology—knowledge concerning intellectual inquiry itself and the institutions that support it—can be said to face, now more than ever, the most pressing and concrete of challenges.
Husserl, who once pursued the ideals of transcendental philosophy, turned in his later years toward the phenomenology of the lifeworld. Wittgenstein, who initially illuminated the essential structure of the language of knowledge with the notion of logical form, later shifted to a philosophy of language games grounded in forms of life as their ultimate basis. This parallel is, of course, no mere coincidence. In both cases, we find expressions of the most profound and urgent reflections on the past and future of epistemology.
[Kuroda, Wataru]
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※The above article is a translation of the Japanese article. Please refer to the Japanese article below for more details.
黒田亘の「認識論」(1988年): 本に溺れたい
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